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Abstract 
Expropriation of foreign-owned property continues to be part of the modern economy. Under 
what conditions do governments have the ability to expropriate foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in a globalizing world? I argue that governments have more permissive space to expropriate 
when host to a greater diversity of nationalities of foreign firms. One means of observing this 
dynamic is through diplomatic advocacy, because diplomats scale back their efforts when FDI 
national diversity weakens diplomatic leverage. This paper uses case studies of European and 
American investors in Argentina, Ukraine, Russia, and Romania to link variation in 
expropriation to FDI national diversity via diplomacy. If we take FDI national diversity as a 
marker of global integration, more integrated governments are – counterintuitively – more likely 
to expropriate. 
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Foreign direct investors operate within another state’s jurisdiction, which means that their 
property rights are ensured by a foreign government’s promise of restraint. Nationalization, 
regulatory taking, and incremental expropriation are government violations of its explicit and 
implicit promises to honor foreign owners’ property rights.1  Some analysts predicted the demise 
of expropriation in the early 1990s, but it remains prominent around the developing world.2 For 
example, from 1990 through 2012 foreign firms publicly sued at least 94 host states at least 475 
times for unlawful interference with their property.3 The rapid increase of FDI into the 
developing world demonstrates that far from all property is expropriated. Nevertheless, foreign 
firms have accused the overwhelming majority of emerging economy governments at one time 
or another of violating their property rights.4  This is despite the fact that many see expropriation 
as out of bounds in a globalizing world, in which governments are expected to reassure foreign 
firms and, at a minimum, respect the contracts they make with foreign firms lest foreign capital 
flee.5 
Indeed, when a firm faces the threat of expropriation by a host government, one of its 
options is to flee. But capital flight can be costly. Instead, a firm can choose a diplomatic option. 
Diplomatic advocacy by a foreign firm’s home country has long aided firms in efforts to 
reestablish the integrity of their property rights. In particular, home government actors can create 
issue linkages between firms’ property and other aspects of the bilateral relationship, such as aid 
                                                          
1 I use the term “expropriation” covers incidents in which, from a foreign firm’s point of view, the host government 
acquires value from, takes value away from, or takes equity in a foreign-owned investment without due 
compensation. For similar definitions see Kobrin 1982, Lipson 1985. 
2 Minor 1994; Hajzler 2012. 
3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Database of Treaty-based Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Cases (pending and concluded). International Arrangements Section, Division on Investment, 
Technology, and Enterprise Development. Accessed January 2012. Author’s updates, public records. 
4 Foreign firms’ views on a government action are expected to be the trigger for capital flight and other costly 
actions toward the host government. Therefore, although blame in contract disputes is hotly contested, this paper 
tends to adopt foreign firms’ views on government actions. 
5 E.g. Shleifer and Vishny 2002; Rodrik 2007, 2011; Strange 1996. 
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and trade policy. These actions raise the costs of expropriation to a host government. Yet home 
country diplomats are not always successful advocates for their nationals’ property rights, and 
the intensity of their efforts varies. This paper uses diplomatic advocacy to illustrate conditions 
under which governments expropriate foreign investors. 
A home government fights for its own firms, but home governments are uninterested in 
expending political capital on behalf of firms from other countries. Home governments’ 
reactions to other nationalities’ disputes are observationally equivalent to indifference. Taking 
this premise that home countries care about their own, I derive a counterintuitive implication for 
a government’s treatment of the FDI it hosts. The greater the diversity of nationalities of foreign 
investors present in the host country, the less impact deteriorating relations with one country will 
have on the host government’s overall access to capital. All else equal, national diversity among 
foreign investors generates permissive space for host governments to expropriate some foreign 
investors.6  
To demonstrate the effect of FDI national diversity on expropriation, I describe the 
dynamics of diplomatic advocacy in case studies from Ukraine, Russia, and Romania (1998-
2011). Limiting analysis to a particular world region, with a relatively common pool of potential 
foreign investors, helps to maintain consistent comparisons among investor-state relations. 
Additionally, these countries have short histories of rule of law, implying that diplomatic 
pressure to respect property rights should be all the more salient.7 Variation in diplomatic 
success in protecting property rights thus constitutes a puzzle. Case studies are supported by 
more than one-hundred interviews with firm executives, diplomats, and government officials.8 I 
first use American experience in Ukraine to link change in FDI national diversity to change in 
                                                          
6 Mosley (2000) calls permissive space “room to move.” 
7 Li and Resnick 2003, Jensen et al 2012. 
8 See Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics on interviews. 
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foreign investors’ property rights protections. Second, I explain different outcomes associated 
with the same state-owned Norwegian firm in the context of high FDI national diversity in 
Russia and low FDI national diversity in Ukraine. Third, I demonstrate that both Austrian 
diplomats and American diplomats are unsuccessful when lobbying on behalf of their aggrieved 
firms under high FDI national diversity in Romania. See Table 1.  
Exploiting variation in FDI national diversity in these ways allows me to provide 
evidence against three alternative explanations for variation in diplomatic success in deterring 
expropriation: bigger investments (from wealthy countries) lead to more effective diplomacy; 
home state ownership leads to more effective diplomacy; and home and/or host state 
membership in the European Union (EU) leads to more effective diplomacy. See Table 2. While 
these alternatives offer poor explanations for variation in expropriation, I find that the diversity 
of FDI nationalities in the host country does much to explain the permissive space that 
sometimes allows developing country governments to expropriate foreign firms, even in an era 
of economic globalization.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the FDI national diversity 
theory and draws on investor-state conflict in Argentina to illustrate it. I then lay out the research 
design and contrast the theory with three alternative hypotheses. The case studies follow. Finally, 
I emphasize the continued importance of home governments in an economically integrated 
world. What is more, this research demonstrates that deeper global integration via exposure to a 
greater national diversity of foreign firms can undermine government commitments to property 
rights and rule of law. 
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How Diplomats Advocate for Firms 
Home country diplomats link firms’ property rights to other issues in the bilateral 
relationship by threatening bilateral trade relations, foreign aid distribution, or voting at 
international economic organizations in retaliation for expropriation.9 Oye calls this kind of issue 
linkage “bracketing” – when diplomats make threats that inaction on one issue will trigger 
punishments in another issue area, which in this case compounds the costs of lost bilateral capital 
access.10 In general, by lengthening the shadow of the future, a home government attempts to 
elicit cooperation from a host government and increase the credibility of the host’s commitments 
to its nationals’ property rights. There has been some debate as to whether “gunboats” have come 
to foreign firms’ aid in the past.11 At present, home government efforts on behalf of their 
national firms abroad have not been militaristic.12 But governments certainly use issue linkage to 
fight for their investors.13 In one example, the Indian government in 2012 withheld US$25 
million in aid to the Maldives when the Maldivian government nationalized (without 
compensation) the Indian-owned central airport in the country.14 
 Home country efforts in Argentina demonstrate the breadth of issue linkages used in the 
fight against expropriation today. Since its 2002 default and financial crisis, Argentina has grown 
infamous for violating the property rights of foreign investors.15 French Ministers warned that 
France would “defend the interests of French companies” and threatened to link their firms’ fate 
                                                          
9 At the turn of the twentieth century, governments host to FDI tried with the Calvo Doctrine to forbid home 
governments from interfering on behalf of their nationals’ firms abroad, but the Doctrine has never made it into 
international law.  
10 Oye 1992. See also Lohmann 1997. In a similar vein, Dreher et al (2009) find evidence of governments trading 
UN Security Council votes for IMF loans. 
11 Tomz 2007, Lipson 1985, Wells and Ahmad 2007. But see Mitchener and Weidenmier 2005. 
12 Unhappy investors, on the other hand, have been militaristic: US bondholders held an Argentinian naval vessel 
hostage in a Ghanian port in an attempt to recover damages from Argentina. “Argentina takes ship dispute with 
Ghana to UN court,” BBC News: Latin America and Caribbean, 14 November 2012. 
13 For examples of issue linkage from Indonesia see Wells and Ahmad 2007.  
14 “GMR Row: India Freezes Aid to Maldives, Ties Under Stress.” IBN Live, 3 December 2012. 
15 Blustein 2005. 
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to France’s support for Argentine tariff adjustment and France’s votes at the IMF and the World 
Bank.16 However, France has not publicly followed through on these threats, despite the fact that 
several French firms are suing Argentina. In 2012, President Obama suspended US trade benefits 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for Argentina in retaliation for Argentina’s 
non-payment of US$300 million to two expropriated American firms.17 But the US took six 
years from the original court award to impose sanctions on Argentina, despite consistent 
lobbying from the US business community. In a well-publicized expropriation, Argentina 
nationalized the dominant Spanish energy firm in the country in 2012. In retaliation, Spain 
threatened actions on “diplomacy, trade, industry, and energy,” and the country quickly halted 
imports of biodiesel that had earned Argentinian exporters EUR750 million the previous year.18 
Yet Spain re-allowed imports late in the year, despite the absence of restitution.19 Spain also 
promised that the European Union would undertake “very clear interventions” on Spain’s behalf 
with regard to the expropriated energy firm, but the EU issued only a non-binding resolution.20 
An anonymous EU official summed up the EU’s inaction: “This is a matter of investment and 
expropriation which is dealt with by the bilateral treaty.”21 Just months after nationalizing the 
Spanish investment, Argentina and the nationalized energy firm held a roadshow searching for 
                                                          
16 Olleta 2007. 
17 To be eligible for GSP a country has to be free of expropriation claims. Additionally, the 2000 African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (HR 1432) allows the government to withhold benefits from countries facing outstanding 
American expropriation claims. Wells 2005: 442. 
18 “YPF oil: Spain threatens retaliation against Argentina.” BBC News, 18 April 2012. 
19 Argentina had issued a WTO complaint over the biodiesel embargo, which it dropped when the embargo ended. 
Jennifer M. Freedman. “Argentina Suspends WTO Complaint after Spain Ends Biofuels Curbs.” Bloomberg, 25 
January 2013. 
20 Spain called for international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO to push Argentina “to return [to] 
the path of international rule of law,” but those organizations have not taken action. Quoted in “YPF oil.” 
21 Quoted in “YPF oil.” The EU, as well as Latin American countries and the US, have in 2012 taken joint action 
against Argentinian tariffs. Tariffs affect firms of all nationalities and are conducive to cross-national cooperation, in 
contrast to expropriation which I contend is perceived as a nationality-delimited issue. 
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strategic investors from the UK and soon received commitments from American, Norwegian, 
and Chinese firms.22  
France, the US, and Spain have each acted bilaterally and leveraged issue linkages in 
their public responses to their nationals’ expropriation. However, all three home governments 
have been somewhat ambivalent in their follow-through on threats.  I contend that the FDI 
nationality landscape has engendered this ambivalence and facilitated the Argentine 
government’s expropriation of several foreign firms. As one of the most attractive South 
American markets (despite its macroeconomic troubles), Argentina has been host to very high 
FDI national diversity. Figure 1 depicts this diversity by using an inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI).23 The values can be interpreted as the effective number of OCED nationalities of 
investors present in the country, weighted by the size of their cumulative national investment.24 
Across 74 developing countries, the HHI from 1990-2008 averaged between 2-3 effective OECD 
nationalities, making Argentina among the most diverse investor environments.25 Figure 1 also 
charts FDI stock in Argentina over this period, which, although dropping in direct response to 
Argentina’s economic crisis, regrew quickly in the next years. With a diversity of investors 
present and more FDI entering, Argentina has been able to expropriate some firms while still 
maintaining (albeit not maximizing) capital access. The next section explains why diplomatic 
efforts are more likely to fail in an environment of FDI national diversity. 
                                                          
22 Andrew Trotman. “Argentina seeks UK funds for expropriated oil group YPF.” The Telegraph 14 September 
2012. “YPF says it is talks with Statoil.” Market Watch: The Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2012. 
23 See Figure 1 for calculation. 
24 Source: OECD. Unfortunately, the measure does not include new “South” sending countries, as robust data is 
unavailable. However, omitting FDI originating in other home countries causes me to underestimate FDI national 
diversity, based on the plausible assumption that a small number of South investors do not account for such a large 
proportion of host country FDI stock as to overwhelm the distribution of OECD investors.  
25 The highest average OECD FDI national diversity is Turkey, with 6.8 effective nationalities from 1990-2008. 
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Diplomacy and FDI National Diversity 
Foreign firms entering emerging markets take measures to protect their investments from 
political risks. When new risks arise, foreign firms are interested in “recuperation mechanisms” 
that recover previous levels of property rights protections.26 FDI exit or diversion is the 
recuperation mechanism that exerts direct pressure on a host government’s access to foreign 
capital.27 However, from the foreign firm’s point of view, exit is an expensive option of last 
resort. Firms choosing to exit or divert capital in response to changed risks must leave behind 
sunk capital and incur transition costs. Instead, exercised alongside or in lieu of exit, “voice” can 
be a cheap and effective option for foreign firms to recoup property rights protections. As 
Hirschman expressed it, voice occurs when actors articulate their interests in order to get, in this 
case, a government to return to its previous performance.28 Diplomats are ready-made actors 
with the organizational capacity to advocate directly with host government officials. With 
diplomats’ voice on hand, the consequences of expropriation are more visible and immediately 
threatening to a host government’s interest in maintaining good relations with the home 
government. Of course, national diplomats represent national governments. Diplomats have the 
capacity to fight for firms from their home country but little interest in advocating on behalf of 
non-national firms – even, as in Argentina, when investor disputes might be related. Structurally, 
firms do not have built-in access to another home country’s diplomats. In terms of incentives, 
non-national firms could be competitors of national firms, and non-national firms are not 
involved in voting or campaign contributions at home. A firm’s access to this important form of 
“voice” is delimited by nationality.  
                                                          
26 Hirschman 1970. 
27 The author explores this mechanism in a companion paper (Forthcoming). 
28 Ibid. 
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However, the level of effort put forth by home country diplomats on behalf of their firms 
is endogenous to the likelihood that efforts to deter expropriation will be successful. This is 
where the landscape of foreign investors in the host country comes into play. Diplomats have 
more power and leverage to deter expropriation when there are fewer other national groups to 
which a host government can turn for FDI and solid diplomatic relations. In contrast, when 
foreign investor nationalities are more diverse, the deterrent effect of one nationality’s voice is 
muffled. In this case, home government actors are more likely to find that it is better to downplay 
or pull back diplomacy than demonstrate that their efforts are insufficient to sway host 
government officials. As a result, we should observe less willing and effective diplomacy around 
expropriation when the diversity of FDI nationalities is high. This is one implication of the 
hypothesis under consideration here: the greater the diversity of FDI nationalities in a host 
country, the more likely the host government is to expropriate foreign firms. 
The idea that multinational corporations have a nationality is controversial.29 
Multinational corporations are often characterized as entities that exert power on their own, 
undirected by home country governments. In stark contrast to these views portraying 
multinational firms as trans- or meta-national, I show how powerful a foreign firm’s nationality 
can be. One source of nationality’s power is in home governments’ continued ability to project 
power on their firms’ behalf. 
If nationality matters for multinational firms, what about firms that have roots in multiple 
home countries? Mergers and acquisitions leave some multinationals with more than one set of 
national ties, and sometimes firms invest in third countries via second country subsidiaries. 
Whether “true” multinationals can access multiple sources of diplomacy, or whether this 
encourages free riding by some of the firm’s home countries, is not ex ante clear. Diplomatic 
                                                          
29 Ohmae 1999, Stopford 1998, Kobrin 2001, Strange 1996. But see Doremus et al, 1999. 
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support from multiple home countries has occurred: for example, ArcelorMittal in Ukraine has 
ownership from France, Germany, the UK, and Luxembourg and has received public support 
from all four governments.30 If claims on multiple home countries diminish the likelihood of 
advocacy, then we would expect little diplomacy regardless of FDI national diversity. But, 
national diplomats continue to advocate for their firms and sometimes successfully deter 
expropriation. Nationality matters even in a world of complicated multinational ownership 
structures. 
Research Design and Alternative Hypotheses 
 To demonstrate that FDI national diversity increases the likelihood of expropriation, I use 
case studies that leverage both over-time and cross-country variation. Cases are drawn from 
foreign firms’ relations with host governments in Ukraine, Russia, and Romania. Choosing three 
countries similar with respect to geography and history helps to establish a baseline type of 
potential foreign investor under consideration, as these are standard, positively signed 
determinants of FDI. From 1998 to 2008 these three countries had roughly similar exposure to 
FDI as a percentage of GDP, with an average of 2.1 percent in Russia, 3.8 percent in Ukraine, 
and 5.1 percent in Romania. I use several cases of non-resource firms to demonstrate variation in 
expropriation outside of industries traditionally thought to be subject to higher expropriation 
risks.31  
As countries in transition, governments in these states are uniquely scrutinized for their 
adherence to market principles like property rights protections.32 From this point of view, 
expropriation is surprising in these locations. On the other hand, post-communist transition 
                                                          
30 Wellhausen (Forthcoming). 
31 This literature traces back to Vernon 1971. 
32 Roland 2004. 
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countries have very little experience with today’s notions of rule of law, due to their short 
histories as market economies and (weak) democracies.33 This logic would tend to suggest that 
these countries would be likely to expropriate. From either perspective, variation in expropriation 
is a puzzle. Finally, all the home-host country pairs discussed in the cases have Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) in place. BITs are instruments that generally allow investors to sue 
host governments directly, without the approval of their home government. Some posit that one 
result of BITs is that home country governments stay out of investor-state disputes.34 However, 
the continued diplomatic advocacy discussed here, not to mention in cases around the world, 
goes to belie that expectation. 
Most importantly, these three countries demonstrate considerable variation on the 
explanatory variable: FDI national diversity. Figure 2 displays an inverse HHI that captures the 
effective number of OECD home countries present in Ukraine, Russia, and Romania each year.35 
Ukraine’s FDI national diversity was low in the early 1990s, increased to the mid-2000s, and 
then sharply dropped in the late 2000s. In both Romania and Russia, FDI national diversity 
began low but quickly rose to be among the most diverse emerging economies in the world. 
Figure 2 labels the home-host country combinations used in the case studies, which are taken at 
moments of high and low FDI national diversity within and across Ukraine, Russia, and 
Romania. See also Table 1. Four cases resulted in expropriation while two others resulted in 
restitution and deterrence. 
Table 2 lists three key alternative hypotheses and the cases that present evidence against 
them. The first alternative hypothesis is that the diplomats of nationalities with dominant shares 
of FDI in the host country should be effective in deterring expropriation, which would follow if 
                                                          
33 Kornai 1992, Bandelj 2008. 
34 E.g., UNCTAD 2010, Van Harten 2005. 
35 See Figure 1 for calculation. 
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the nationality with the most leverage is the one with the most capital committed. This 
hypothesis is not mutually exclusive with the paper’s focus on FDI national diversity. However, I 
demonstrate that the largest FDI nationality can be a target of expropriation and that small 
nationalities can be able to achieve restitution. I do this by tracing the experience of American 
firms in Ukraine – dominant but expropriated in the late 1990s, and not well represented but 
provided restitution in the late 2000s. 
Second, variation in expropriation may be explained by variation in firm access to 
diplomatic support. In a strong test of this contention, state-owned firms should have consistent 
access to diplomatic support that effectively deters expropriation, as home governments as firm 
owners should be primed to prioritize their firms’ property. However, I demonstrate that the 
same Norwegian state-owned firm had access to successful diplomatic lobbying in Ukraine, in an 
environment of low FDI national diversity, but did not have access to diplomatic lobbying in 
Russia, where FDI national diversity was considerably higher. 
A third alternative is to focus not on the efforts of national diplomats but on the possible 
effects of supra-national advocacy. In particular, home and/or host country membership in the 
European Union should explain variation in expropriation. One may expect that firms from EU 
member states benefit from EU-level diplomacy and coordinated action across member state 
diplomats.36  Additionally, one may expect that EU member states would not engage in 
expropriation, as the EU would not sanction such actions. I focus on the experiences of Austrian 
firms in Romania to show that EU-level diplomacy has been at best weak around investor 
disputes. Indeed, in an interview at the Ukrainian affiliate of a firm from a Western European 
                                                          
36 Cases occur both before and shortly after the EU Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated (2007) and came into force 
(2009), which gives the EU competence in the area of foreign investment. The FDI national diversity theory predicts 
that, even under the Lisbon Treaty, national diplomats will retain interests in their nationals’ disputes and the 
willingness to follow through with issue linkage under conducive conditions. As the EU continues to strengthen its 
activities in investment protection, a full test of the Lisbon Treaty’s effects is left to future research. 
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home country, the CEO lamented this fact, wishing that there was an EU “embassy” to represent 
his firm in its disputes with the government.37 Second, I use American actors’ experiences to 
demonstrate that the EU has supported expropriation, despite the fact that most EU member 
states are traditional FDI-sending countries. 
 These cases are drawn from 133 interviews I conducted from 2009-2011 in Ukraine and 
Romania, with supplementary interviews in Moldova, Germany, and the United States. 
Respondents included local heads of multinational affiliates, law firms, and foreign investor 
associations from twelve different home countries. Additional respondents were government 
officials, former diplomats, elected politicians, and representatives from international 
organizations interested in foreign investment and the rule of law like the IMF. Appendix 1 
provides a summary of respondents. The purpose of these interviews was to establish investors’ 
experiences around the maintenance of property rights and reconstruct the narratives around 
investor-state disputes. I supplement interview evidence with primary source materials.   
Americans in Ukraine: Expropriation and Restitution 
 
With the unexpected break-up of the Soviet Union, US and European investors benefitted 
from a wide array of home country programs encouraging investment in Ukraine and the region. 
FDI national diversity increased as foreign firms invested in Ukraine’s traditional strengths in 
agriculture and heavy industry as well as in manufacturing, finance, and retail.38 American firms 
accounted for the largest proportion of Ukraine’s FDI stock throughout the 1990s, but by 2003, a 
variety of OECD and some regional investors were responsible for Ukraine’s increasing FDI 
nationality mix (see Figure 2). Ukraine benefitted from the movement eastward in search of low-
                                                          
37 Interview, manufacturing firm, Ukraine. 
38 Interviews, various, Ukraine. WIIW Database on Foreign Direct Investment in Central, East, and Southeast 
Europe (2009). 
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cost inputs as the EU expanded, receiving FDI from Western and Central European firms. 
Russian investment also increased rapidly. In an interview, one Ukrainian politician summarized 
the growing diversity of investor nationalities in this period by pointing to South Korean firms’ 
investment into auto parts manufacturing in the late 1990s. This investment captured his feeling 
that Ukraine was truly integrating with the wider world economy, despite its status as a laggard 
in political and economic transition.39  
Ukraine’s FDI nationalities became more homogenous beginning with an extremely large 
investment into Ukraine: the 2005 sale of Ukraine’s major steel mill, Kryvorizhstal, for US$4.8 
billion. This FDI infusion and the Orange Revolution that brought it about sparked the interest of 
major Western European multinationals, accounting for the FDI boom in steel as well as 
consumer products, agriculture, and banking from 2005 to 2008.40 As a result, a large proportion 
of Ukraine’s FDI became concentrated in the hands of German, British, and French investors, 
which lowered the FDI nationality mix even as Ukraine’s FDI stock grew rapidly (see again 
Figure 2). 
In this context, American efforts to deter expropriation from 1997 to 2004 failed. Once 
dominant American-origin FDI was in seventh place among OECD investors by 2008. 
Nevertheless, when Ukraine became reliant on fewer, more concentrated national groups for 
capital access in the late 2000s, American firms across a variety of industries called on US 
diplomatic support and succeeded in restoring a ten-year-old broken contract. American 
diplomatic efforts in Ukraine provide evidence of the weakness of diplomacy in times of high 
FDI national diversity and better diplomatic leverage in an environment of low FDI national 
diversity. 
                                                          
39 Interview, Ukrainian Member of Parliament, Ukraine. 
40 Wilson 2005. 
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In 1997, the US State Department assembled a list of twelve firms, including small 
investors and major multinationals like Cargill, which complained of the systematic targeting of 
American investors by the Ukrainian government. In 1997, Congress made some US$80 million 
in aid to Ukraine conditional on “significant progress toward resolution” of the twelve disputes.41  
Though Ukraine’s government did nothing, the US distributed full aid; the threat, non-action, 
and aid distribution repeated in 1998.  
Ukraine had little reason to believe that continued violation of American firms’ property 
rights would threaten its broader access to FDI. No other home governments publicly supported 
the American position or threatened to withhold aid.42 A key American businessman testified 
before Congress in 2000 that: “It is common practice for [the Ukrainian government] to be told 
by the Europeans…[that] contracts better go to German or French companies, not American 
companies.”43 Far from worrying they would face the same problems as American firms, 
European-origin firms and their diplomats enjoyed convivial government relations and, by 
extension, better property rights sanctity. The Ukrainian government was free to attribute the 
twelve broken American contracts to the firms’ naive involvement with “God knows whom” in 
the gray economy; this framing went unchallenged by the US.44 
One of the American firms involved had a joint venture with the Ukrainian Defense 
Ministry to recycle Soviet ammunition. The Defense Ministry reneged on its contracted 
deliveries, and the American firm exited in 1999 and received US$17.7 million from its political 
                                                          
41 This threat is reminiscent of the “Hickenlooper Amendment” of 1962, which required the US to suspend aid to 
countries expropriating US property without just compensation. 
42 Similarly, US actors did not coordinate with British firms complaining of expropriation at the time. 
43 “Treatment of US Business in Eastern and Central Europe.” Testimony by Kempton Jenkins, President of the 
Ukraine-US Business Council. Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate (106th Congress, Second session): 28 June 2000. 
44 “US Presses Investor Disputes.” Kyiv Post: 11 February 1999. 
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and expropriation risk insurer, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).45 OPIC, 
a US government agency that is a foreign investor in itself, offers financing, investment funds, 
and political risk insurance for American firms in emerging markets. OPIC expected no problem 
with the Ukrainian government’s contractually required reimbursement: US$17.7 million was a 
relatively small sum; OPIC had already made or facilitated over US$200 million in investments 
in Ukraine and stood ready to do more; and OPIC did not require Ukraine to make a specific 
admission of guilt in the matter.46 Nevertheless, Ukraine did not pay and OPIC exited. Estimates 
are that Ukraine lost millions of dollars in American FDI over the following years due to OPIC’s 
absence. 
At the time, American actors paid little attention to OPIC’s dispute. OPIC was not 
mentioned in Congressional testimony on the treatment of American investors in Ukraine in 
2000, nor was the broken contract a priority at the US Embassy. OPIC negotiated its own 
provisional settlement in late 2004, but January 2005 ushered in the opposition Yushchenko 
government that emerged from the extraordinary Orange Revolution. In this major moment of 
turmoil, the pro-reform Yushchenko government reneged on the OPIC settlement. Yet 
Yushchenko’s Orange government did more than miss the deadline – it did not reinstate OPIC 
during its eight months in power. OPIC canceled its provisional operations in Ukraine. After 
2005, Ukrainian politics rapidly deteriorated, fistfights became common in the legislature, and 
the government’s general political outlook turned eastward. But new American FDI would help 
Ukraine reduce its reliance on the now-dominant groups of Western European-origin firms, as 
well as a growing set of Russian-origin firms. Continued American FDI diversion would further 
concentrate FDI nationalities and, as predicted here, constrain the government’s ability to 
                                                          
45 “Rift threatens to blow up ammunitions joint venture,” Kyiv Post: 30 October 1998.  
46 Interviews, Washington, D.C. (3) and Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
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prioritize other concerns over commitments made to foreign firms. Even as the Ukrainian 
government turned its attention eastward, this environment strengthened American bargaining 
power. An American investor association and American diplomats pressured the Ukrainian 
government to reinstate OPIC in 2009. 
The US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) and American diplomats discussed OPIC 
repeatedly with Ukrainian officials from 2005 to 2009, by which time the USUBC represented 
over 100 firms.47 In contrast to the fizzled efforts in the late 1990s, American efforts brought a 
key Ukrainian politician, the Vice Prime Minister, on board to shepherd OPIC reinstatement 
through the government. American diplomats drew on large American firms like Microsoft and 
DHL to make the issue of an old broken contract salient to a Ukrainian government that was not 
responsible for either the original breach or the breach of the provisional settlement in 2005.48 
Diplomats’ main task was to assuage the Ukrainian government’s concerns that OPIC restitution 
would have a negative effect on non-American foreign investment. A Memorandum of 
Understanding in 2008 addressed this point, resolving that restitution “should not be considered 
as constituting any admission on behalf of the Ukrainian side of any commitment, debt, 
complaint, or other claim of any company.”49  US Vice President Biden lauded progress during a 
visit to Ukraine, saying that bringing OPIC back would “make it easier for American companies 
to reinvest in Ukraine, and invest in the first place.”50  Once the final resolution was signed in 
2009, OPIC immediately restored operations.  
                                                          
47 Interviews (3), Washington, D.C. 
48 Large multinationals’ participation is the more notable because they have little need for OPIC services: large firms 
are often priced out of political risk insurance and can acquire cheap financing from their parent company. Instead, 
these firms framed their advocacy in terms of reestablishing respect for American-owned property. Interviews, 
multinational representatives and investor organizations, Washington, D.C. and Ukraine. 
49 “Bogdan Danylyshyn and William Taylor sign Memorandum,” Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Minister’s Press 
office: 11 November 2008. 
50 Statement by Vice President Biden after meeting with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine. The White 
House, Office of the Vice President: 21 July 2009. 
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In contrast to the late 1990s, Ukrainian officials agreed to facilitate OPIC’s entry and 
restore American actors’ sense of their property rights protections.51 The changed follow-through 
on the part of diplomats correlates with the change in FDI national diversity. This is despite the 
fact that American investors had represented the largest portion of FDI in Ukraine in the late 
1990s and was one of the smaller OECD investors in the late 2000s.  
Norwegians and Expropriation in Russia, Deterrence in Ukraine 
 
Figure 1 shows that Russia’s FDI nationality mix in the late 2000s was considerably 
higher than Ukraine’s. As a large economy with a significant endowment of natural resources, 
Russia possesses the structural features expected to give its government leverage over foreign 
firms at the time of investment and after contracts have been struck.52 Throughout the 2000s, 
Russia’s political actors proved very willing to engage in high-profile conflicts with foreign 
firms; for example, Russia’s expropriations of foreign oil and gas firms BP and Royal Dutch 
Shell gained international prominence. Nevertheless, the continued entry of investors from many 
national origins into Russia goes to show that some investors weigh the potential benefits of 
investment above the increased likelihood of property rights violations that these factors suggest. 
One may expect a home government to stand behind its “national champion” investing in 
a risky location like Russia – especially when the home government has ownership in the firm. 
Indeed, the Norwegian government intervened in Russia on behalf of its state-owned 
telecommunications firm, Telenor, in 2000 and 2004, first to deter the Russian Communications 
Ministry from taking back allocated frequencies, and second to lower Telenor’s suddenly high 
                                                          
51 Norwegian (see below) and French firms also deterred expropriation from 2005 to 2008. 
52 Vernon 1971, Rudra and Jensen 2011. 
19 
 
 
tax burden.53 In the second half of the 2000s, however, Telenor lost several legal cases that were 
brought by shadowy shareholders and heard in obscure Siberian towns in what were seen by 
international observers as politically driven rulings. Once these decisions began coming down 
against Telenor, Norway’s government stepped back. In 2006, the Norwegian Trade and Industry 
Minister said his government would not interfere and that “there should be no concern that [the 
conflict behind the suits] would scare away Norwegian investment in Russia.”54 With this 
statement, the Norwegian government explicitly downplayed the bilateral implications of 
Russian actions against Telenor and rolled back diplomatic advocacy. By 2010, Telenor’s 
accrued fines in Russia totaled US$1.7 billion. The Russian government froze Telenor’s assets, 
effectively halting its ability to operate in Russia. 
Similarly questionable legal procedures had resulted in expropriation in Russia before, 
but no public comment came from Sweden, Finland, or the Swedish-Finnish telecommunications 
firm TeliaSonera, which too had faced an analogous dispute in Russia.55 Perhaps these home 
countries kept quiet to gain competitive advantages or to avoid retribution. In any case, in an 
environment in which entry and reinvestment by a variety of national groups was the norm, the 
Norwegian government explicitly stepped back from using its nationals’ FDI in Russia as 
leverage in the Telenor conflict. The Russian government had little incentive to change its stance 
toward Telenor’s operations and followed through with expropriation. 
The same Norwegian state-owned firm’s experience in Ukraine was markedly different. 
From 2005 to 2009, Telenor was embroiled in a commercial dispute (related to the dispute in 
Russia) that spilled over into its relations with the Ukrainian government. Ukraine faced 
                                                          
53 “Norwegian Telenor offered ultimatum to VimpelCom.” The Russian Business Monitor. 1 April 2005. 
54 “Norway, Russia don’t plan to interfere in Telenor, Alfa Conflict.” Ukraine Business Daily. 16 March 2006. 
55 TeliaSonera had a 44 percent stake in a Russian mobile firm (Megafon) and had been involved in its own 
shareholder dispute with the Russian firm at the heart of the Telenor dispute (Alfa Group). 
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significant pressure to breach its commitments to Telenor, not only from domestic sources but 
also from Russian business and political actors aiming to gain by Telenor’s downfall. But with 
fewer other national investor groups to draw on in this period, the Ukrainian government was 
sensitive to retaining Norwegian investment. In fact, preserving Norwegian investment in 
Ukraine was necessary to keep the mobile telecommunications industry from being wholly 
Russian-owned, an outcome opposed by virtually all political players in Ukraine. While the 
Ukrainian government at times wavered in its treatment of Telenor, it ultimately did not break its 
commitment to the firm’s fundamental ability to operate and own property in the country. For 
example, in 2006, Members of Parliament argued that three appeals court judges had 
“deliberately pass[ed] an illegal sentence or ruling” in favor of Telenor.56 The Ukrainian MPs, 
sympathetic to Russian interests in the dispute, used domestic targets to score political points. 
The result was a prosecution of the three judges – and not of Telenor.  
 Norwegian investors enjoyed a privileged place in Ukraine, praised by the Ukrainian 
President, for example.57 But as the Telenor dispute progressed, that esteem deteriorated. In 
2007, signs appeared on Kyiv streets and outside Telenor’s offices that read “Norwegians! 
Respect Ukrainian Laws!!” and “Norwegians, go home!”58 A document from the Russian firm 
leaked to the press – “Logical Rationale for the Information Campaign under the Kyivstar 
Contract” – that read in part: “in order to break the existing stereotype whereby Western business 
and, in particular, Norwegian business always plays fair, an information wave of negative 
publicity should be started.”59 Attacks were not framed against Telenor in particular, but against 
                                                          
56 “Prosecutor General’s Office opens criminal case.” Ukraine Business Weekly. 10 October 2006. 
57 “Kuchma orders to open Ukrainian embassy in Norway in near future.” Ukraine Business Report. 30 January 
2004. 
58 “How the Kremlin thawed a telecoms freeze in Siberia.” The Evening Standard (London): 17 November 2008: 29. 
59 Kramer, Andrew. “Russian Company accused of buying press coverage.” The New York Times, 14 March 2007. 
In fact, firms buying press coverage has not been uncommon in countries of the former Soviet Union. 
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Norwegians as a national group. These efforts aimed at isolating Norwegians from other 
nationalities so as to differentiate the legitimacy and importance of their property rights from 
those of others. In other words, Telenor’s detractors thought that the nationality of capital could 
matter to the public and, in turn, to political perceptions of FDI. Indeed, while diplomats from 
other home countries were personally outraged by this anti-Norwegian sentiment in interviews, 
they nevertheless saw no reason to publicly coalesce with Telenor or Norwegians.60 Once 
Norwegians’ implicitly shared risks were made explicit, Norwegian diplomats redoubled their 
efforts to shield Telenor. For example, the Norwegian government and Telenor publicly 
petitioned the Ukrainian government to investigate the “objectivity, impartiality, and 
independence of judges” regarding their “interference with good corporate governance and 
business morals.”61 
In contrast to the situation in Russia, the Ukrainian government never froze Telenor’s 
assets, and the government made some efforts to rectify decisions against Telenor made in the 
judicial system.62 In fact, despite the intense years of conflict in 2006 and 2007, Telenor’s profits 
in Ukraine in 2007 were US$316 million, a year-on-year increase in profitability of 54 percent.63 
Like the Americans advocating on OPIC’s behalf, Norwegians were not the largest or most 
prominent national investor group in Ukraine. But, the Ukrainian government explicitly sought 
                                                          
60 Interviews, American, French, British, and Swedish actors, Ukraine. 
61 “Telenor asks authorities to investigate outcome of 11 rulings of Ukrainian courts.” The Ukrainian Times, 14 
February 2007. 
62 One interpretation of the outcome of Telenor’s conflict could be that the Ukrainian government did breach a 
foreign firm’s property rights: those of the Russian firm. Because international courts validated Telenor’s claims in 
this case, relating the case from Telenor’s point of view aligns with the most objective understanding of the 
Ukrainian government’s actions. That the Ukrainian government showed restraint toward Telenor’s contract goes to 
show that a firm from a major investor home country like Russia may not have sufficient leverage to negate a small 
national investor group’s property rights.  
63 “Ukraine: Telenor profit exceeds US$316mn.” Emersk Ukraine News (via Sostav.ua): 25 July 2008. 
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to maintain what national diversity Ukraine had among its foreign investors in 
telecommunications.64  
Maintaining access to capital from multiple home countries has been so important to the 
Ukrainian government that it exposed the country to a strange scandal in 2012. A Spanish-
speaking man negotiated a US$1.1 billion investment into natural gas on the Black Sea, which 
would generate independence from “foreign” – meaning Russian – ownership of oil and gas.65 
However, it shortly appeared that Gas Natural Fenosa, the firm the negotiator supposedly 
represented, had never heard of him.66 This means that oil and gas remained dominated by 
Russian interests – and the Russian government has in the 2000s shown little restraint in 
diplomatic advocacy on its nationals’ behalf.67 
Contrasts between FDI national diversity in Russia and Ukraine do more to explain the 
variation in expropriation than does the ownership of Telenor. While some firms may indeed 
have more ready access to diplomats by virtue of characteristics like ownership or national 
prominence, whether or not that access deters expropriation is shaped by the environment of 
foreign investor nationalities in the host country. 
Austrians and Americans in Romania: Expropriation in the EU 
 
The first FDI to enter democratic Romania came from Germany, Italy, and France. New 
entrants from these countries followed a pattern: large firms invested, like France’s Renault, and 
                                                          
64 Importantly, Telenor’s Ukrainian conflict ended during the worldwide financial crisis, when FDI into emerging 
economies was on the wane, but Ukraine hosted more FDI than ever before. 
65 The deal’s Ukrainian “boasted” that the day of the signing “can be called the Day of Ukraine’s energy 
independence.” “‘Phantom’ Gas Deal Embarrasses Ukraine Government.” Gulf News, 3 December 2012. 
66 Kramer, Andrew E. “In Ukraine, Mystery Man Fakes a Natural Gas Deal.” The New York Times, 29 November 
2012. 
67 Abdelal 2010. 
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their home country banks came next, like France’s Societe Generale. 68  More and more OECD-
origin investors added to the mix as the 1990s progressed and Romania privatized more and 
more large assets to foreign interests. Firms from neighboring Hungary and Poland had already 
begun to invest in Romania in the years leading up to its EU entry. By 2005, more FDI began to 
flow into new, greenfield investments than into privatizations of state-owned property.69 As 
Figure 1 shows, all of this activity has made Romania’s FDI national diversity high both before 
and after its accession to the EU in 2007. The Romanian government recognizes this. For 
example, Romania’s investment promotion agency highlights 33 successful large projects in 
Romania completed in the 2000s that come from thirteen different home countries: France, 
Spain, Austria, Italy, Germany, Japan, the US, Portugal, Greece, China, Tunisia, Sweden, and 
Belgium.70  
Counterintuitively, the Romanian government has repeatedly compromised the rights of 
foreign firms – from the EU and otherwise – both before and after EU accession. In fact, 
Romania has received more or less explicit EU approval for several of its actions.71 In the case of 
Austrian and American investors, national diplomacy has been unsuccessful in deterring 
alterations to their property rights.72 
Austrians and US$20 Oil 
 
The Romanian government incrementally expropriated the Austrian oil and gas firm 
OMV, forcing a costly renegotiation of OMV’s contract that was linked to a substantial decrease 
                                                          
68 Interviews (3), foreign firms in financial and business services, Romania.  
69 Interview, Romanian government official, Romania. 
70 Romania Trade & Invest. http://www.romtradeinvest.ro/. Accessed March 2012. 
71 In addition to the American case discussed here, the EU has effectively approved of the government’s violation of 
its agreement with a Canadian mining firm (RMGC). Romania has also argued in international lawsuits that its 
expropriatory actions were necessary to align policy with EU standards. See Wellhausen (forthcoming). 
72 Another prominent, analogous case in Romania concerns Canadian investors (in particular, Rosia Montana Gold 
Corporation). 
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in its share price – not to mention arrests of financial analysts associated with the investment. In 
2004, Romania’s government negotiated the privatization of a 51 percent stake in the Romanian 
state oil firm to OMV for US$1.8 billion. But this price was based on long-term world oil price 
estimates of US$20-30 per barrel. As the oil price and OMV’s profits went up, the subsequent 
Romanian government and the Romanian people felt cheated, with one politician calling the 
previous government’s actions an “amazing theft.”73 Nevertheless, the privatization contract was 
strict: the Romanian state could not increase royalties, add taxes on production, or change the 
contract’s foundational assumption of low oil prices, for example.74  
In 2006, two officials from the previous government were arrested on suspicion of 
treason for passing information on the state oil firm to OMV during the privatization 
negotiations. Employees of Credit Suisse First Boston, which had brokered the deal, were also 
arrested as part of an “organized crime ring.”75 In the face of this persecution, OMV agreed in 
2007 to contribute to a social fund to subsidize individual consumer prices. This was despite the 
fact that OMV’s stock lost 4.7 percent in a matter of days when the OMV CEO first discussed 
such a “solidarity fund” with the Romanian President a year earlier.76 
The Austrian Ambassador to Romania supported OMV, publicly pointing out that 4,500 
Austrian companies had invested EUR12 billion in Romania, in banking, real estate, insurance, 
construction materials, IT, and oil and gas.77 His reference to the broad contributions Austrian 
firms had made to the Romanian economy, analogous to Norwegian diplomatic efforts in 
                                                          
73 “Official: Romania’s Petrom Sale, Relinquishing Oil Reserves - “Amazing Theft,” Mediafax News Brief Service, 
18 August 2006. “Romanian president seen under public pressure to review energy privatization,” BBC Monitoring 
European: 17 November 2006. For a good reference on questionable privatizations in the region, see Schwartz 2006. 
74 “Romanian scandals to delay further sales,” Platts Energy in East Europe: 8 December 2006. 
75 Ibid. 
76 “Romania’s President Met With CEO Of Austrian Oil Co OMV,” Mediafax News Brief Service: 20 November 
2006. “Romanian Govt Drops Examination Of Energy Privatizations,” Dow Jones Commodities Service: 16 January 
2007. 
77 “OMV Expects Romania To Honor Petrom-Contract, Not Raise Fees,” Dow Jones International News: 25 
October 2007. “Austria becoming big investor in Romania,” Austria Today: 31 October 2007. 
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Ukraine, shows that the Austrian government tied its country’s broader integration with Romania 
to the threat to OMV. However, as predicted, Austrian efforts there found no cross-national 
support from diplomats of other nationalities. EU representatives remained silent on the issue, 
and other EU countries like Germany and Italy had energy firms that were seen as ready to 
replace OMV.78 American and Canadian interests that were each facing expropriation around the 
same time did not publicly link their situations to that of OMV (or to each other). With Austrian 
interests isolated, OMV remained in the cross hairs of political battles between shifting 
Romanian political coalitions. Romania was able to force a costly contract renegotiation in an 
incidence of incremental expropriation while also criminally prosecuting financial analysts in an 
environment of high FDI national diversity. 
Americans and Transylvanian Highways 
 The American firm Bechtel Group faced trouble from the beginning over its contract to 
build a Transylvanian highway.79 When Bechtel was awarded its contract, a “furious” European 
Union had just funded a road running almost parallel, and, as a result, the EU did not allow 
Romania to use any of its EU infrastructure funds to pay for the project.80 The Romanian 
government forced renegotiation of the contract several times after it was originally signed in 
2003. In 2011, Romania officially broke the contract and Bechtel agreed to give up its right to 
compensation. In an environment with highly diverse FDI nationalities, the Romanian 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 Technically, Bechtel was in Romania on a concession, which does not always qualify as FDI in a statistical sense. 
However, as a foreign firm operating in a host country, with the potential to send signals on expropriation to other 
foreign firms, the case is relevant to theory testing. 
80 John W. Miller. “Focus: EU Eyes Public Contracts as Romania’s Roads Boom.” Dow Jones Capital Markets 
Report: 26 June 2006. “Special Report: Romania’s Roads to Nowhere,” Reuters News: 26 May 2011. 
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government broke a written contract that one official had lamented was “virtually unbreakable” – 
without obvious costly actions from American interests and without EU penalties.81  
The Prime Minister of the government subsequent to that responsible for the contract 
declared that Romania would not agree to special treatment for Bechtel, “even if they are an 
American company.”82 At first, the US Ambassador kept a positive public attitude and remained 
“confident that the Romanian government and Bechtel will find a way.”83 In 2011, the new US 
Ambassador changed tactics when he told top Romanian officials that the broken contract “is 
also about a big Turkish company, it is not only about Romania and an American company.”84 
By emphasizing the Turkish subcontractor’s participation in the project, the US Ambassador 
tried to unite foreign firms’ experiences across national lines. This attempt to link Turkish and 
American investors experiences is telling of the weak leverage American interests alone had over 
the Romanian government’s actions. Predictably, the effort to amass a cross-national coalition 
failed. Neither the Turkish Ambassador nor other Turkish actors took a public position on the 
Bechtel dispute. Ultimately, far from condemning the broken contract, the US Ambassador 
“praised the breakthrough.” The Romanian President said the outcome was possible “thanks to 
the support of the US Embassy.”85 Bechtel and what American support system they had 
responded to the dire situation and cut their losses. 
Despite being Austrian, OMV had no supra-national advocacy on which to draw. Despite 
being an EU member state, Romania has infringed on foreign firms’ property rights while 
enjoying EU support as in the case of Bechtel. Ultimately, national governments retain interests 
                                                          
81 “Special Report: Romania’s Roads to Nowhere,” Reuters News: 26 May 2011. 
82 “Bechtel holds Romania’s Transylvania highway back, Not Funding – Romanian PM,” Mediafax News Service: 
21 October 2008. 
83 “US Ambassador says expropriations, poor financing hinder construction of Romania’s Transylvania highway,” 
Mediafax News Brief Service: 24 October 2010. 
84 “US Ambassador Gitenstein says confident Bechtel contract arrears issue to be resolved,” Rompres: 2 June 2011. 
85 “Romania to make outstanding payments worth 90 mln euros to Bechtel in two tranches,” Rompres: 4 August 
2011. 
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in the viability of their national firms, while the EU maintains priorities that take precedence 
over what foreign firms see as violations of their property rights. 
Expropriation, Nationality, and Diplomacy 
 
Home governments regularly expend political capital to avoid expropriation or achieve 
restitution for their firms that have invested abroad, despite the thought that contemporary 
international law has helped to “depoliticize” investor-state disputes.86 Indeed, investor-state 
dispute resolution through BITs is often contrasted with dispute resolution at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), in which home governments must bring cases on behalf of their aggrieved 
firms. Yet the continued involvement of home governments in investor-state disputes suggests 
that politics plays a role even when firms have the right to bring their own legal cases. Politicized 
investor disputes reflect Krasner’s worldview in which national actors retain sovereign power, 
and the ability to exercise that power, even under conditions of economic globalization.87  
The case studies presented here counter three competing hypotheses. The power of the 
home country, in terms of the amount of capital invested in the host country (or a firm’s 
American nationality), does not clearly correlate with the host government decision to 
expropriate. State ownership of assets does not imply that diplomats will effectively protect 
against expropriation. And the EU, an international institution relevant to both capital-sending 
and capital-receiving countries, has not provided the lobbying power or direct sanctioning of host 
governments necessary to deter expropriation wholesale. Using investments in a variety of 
industries, and a variety of forms of government violations of foreign firms’ property rights, the 
                                                          
86  E.g., UNCTAD 2010, Van Harten 2005. 
87 Krasner 1999. 
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case studies presented here demonstrate that the diversity of FDI nationalities has power in 
explaining the government’s propensity to expropriate. 
Many see multinational corporations as “meta-national” – stateless firms unencumbered 
by their home country nationality. Yet foreign firms can benefit from advocacy by their home 
country diplomats. However, these benefits are conditional on the landscape of FDI nationalities. 
When many home countries are represented in an economy, national diversity becomes a liability 
to diplomats’ leverage while opening permissive space for host governments to act against some 
firms. In other words, the vulnerability of a foreign firm’s property and the strength of a 
diplomat’s advocacy depend on the set of foreign firms present in the host country. If we 
understand the national diversity of foreign firms as one measure of economic integration, the 
theory and evidence here suggest that deeper integration can mitigate home governments’ power, 
even as home governments maintain interests in fighting for their nationals’ rights.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Argentina’s FDI National Diversity and FDI Stock (2000-2008) 
  
FDI national diversity is calculated using an Inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
HHIit= 1/(s1t2 + s2t2 + s3t2 + … + snt2)     
where snt is OECD nationality n’s share of the annual FDI stock in country i in year t. The 
resulting value is the effective number of OECD nationalities in the host economy. 
 
Sources: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina, World Bank WDI 
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Figure 2. FDI National Diversity in Ukraine, Russia, and Romania (with Cases Noted) 
               
National diversity of FDI stock as calculated in Figure 1. 
Source: OECD  
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Table 1. Case Summaries 
FDI National 
Diversity Host Home Outcome 
High Ukraine USA Expropriation 
 
Russia Norway Expropriation 
 
Romania Austria Expropriation 
 
Romania USA Expropriation 
Low Ukraine USA Restitution 
 
Ukraine Norway Deterrence 
 
 
Table 2. Alternative Hypotheses  
Case Alternative Hypothesis 
Americans in Ukraine Diplomats from home countries with large FDI shares can deter expropriation. 
Norwegians in Russia 
Norwegians in Ukraine State-owned firms benefit from diplomacy that deters expropriation. 
Austrians in Romania 
Americans in Romania The European Union plays a key role in deterring expropriation. 
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Appendix 1. Interview Subject Breakdown (2009-2011) 
 
 
Home country Industry Count 
 
Home country Field Count 
Austria finance 1 
 
Argentina government 1 
Canada investor organization 1 
 
Austria government 1 
Canada legal 1 
 
Czech Republic government 1 
Canada natural resources 2 
 
European Union government 2 
Denmark manufacturing 2 
 
Ghana government 1 
France finance 3 
 
Moldova government 4 
France manufacturing 1 
 
Poland government 3 
France natural resources 1 
 
Romania government 2 
Germany finance 2 
 
Switzerland government 1 
Germany manufacturing 1 
 
Ukraine government 4 
Germany natural resources 1 
 
US  government 5 
Germany services 1 
 
. international organization 6 
Israel investor organization 3 
 
Romania think tank 2 
Moldova investor organization 1 
 
Slovak Republic think tank 1 
Moldova services 7 
 
Venezuela think tank 1 
Norway infrastructure 1 
 
Ukraine think tank 5 
Romania services 4 
 
  Total other 40 
Russia finance 3 
    Russia manufacturing 9 
    Russia services 1 
    Sweden manufacturing 1 
    UK infrastructure 1 
    UK legal 1 
    UK manufacturing 1 
    UK services 3 
    Ukraine finance 1 
    Ukraine legal 4 
    Ukraine services 2 
    US  agriculture 1 
    US  finance 5 
    US  infrastructure 1 
    US  investor organization 8 
    US  legal 2 
    US  manufacturing 5 
    US  natural resources 3 
    US  services 5 
    (Europe) investor organization 3 
      Total investors 93 
 
   
